WANDA E. MOORE, et.
al., Plaintiffs, v. CSX CORPORATION, Defendant.
No. 5:94-CV-596-BR(1)
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, WESTERN
DIVISION
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7213
May 3, 1995, Decided
May 3, 1995, FILED
DISPOSITION: [*1] Motion
by defendant for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED and this action is
DISMISSED.
OVERVIEW: After their
son was killed in a collision with a train at a railroad crossing,
the administrators filed a wrongful death action against the
company, alleging that the train engineer was employed by the
company, that he operated the train on the company's behalf, and
that he did so in a negligent manner. In its answer, the company
denied ownership of the train, denied negligence, and pled
contributory negligence. The company later filed a motion for
summary judgment. The court granted the company's motion, holding
that: (1) the company had established that the train was owned and
that the engineer was employed by the company's wholly-owned
subsidiary, and plaintiffs, by failing to show either fraud or that
the subsidiary was a mere instrumentality of the company, failed to
show any reason why the company should be held responsible for the
actions of its subsidiary; (2) plaintiffs offered no evidence in
support of the allegations of negligence contained in the complaint;
and (3) the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
because there was nothing to keep him from seeing the train and
yielding the right of way.
OUTCOME: The court
denied the company's motion for summary judgment in the
administrators' wrongful death action.
COUNSEL:
For WANDA E. MOORE,
JIMMY A. MOORE, both Co-Administrators of the estate of Jonathan
Exum Moore, plaintiffs: Robert V. Lucas, Lucas, Bryant &
Denning, Selma, NC.
For CSX CORPORATION,
defendant: John R. Jolly, Jr., Poyner & Spruill, Raleigh, NC.
Randall R. Adams, Poyner & Spruill, Rocky Mount, NC.
JUDGES: W. EARL BRITT,
United States District Judge
OPINION BY: W. EARL
BRITT
OPINION:
ORDER
Before the court is
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter has been fully
briefed and is ready for ruling.
I
The case was instituted
in the Superior Court Division of the General Court of Justice of
Johnston County, North Carolina on 15 July 1994 and removed to this
court on 11 August 1994. Discovery has been completed and the case
is currently scheduled for trial on 5 June 1995.
II
Plaintiffs, Wanda E. and
Jimmy A. Moore, are the parents and co-administrators of the estate
of their son, Jonathan Exum Moore, who was killed in a collision
with a train at a grade crossing in Johnston County at approximately
10:30 p.m. on 22 September 1992 and bring this wrongful death action
based on negligence. In particular, plaintiffs allege that the
engineer operated the train in the following negligent respects: (a)
without maintaining proper control; (b) without maintaining a proper
lockout; (c) at a speed greater than was reasonable; (d) by failing
to decrease the speed as necessary to avoid a collision; (e) by
failing [*2] to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an
intersection; and, (f) in a careless and reckless manner. Plaintiffs
further allege that the engineer Was employed by defendant and
operated the train on defendant's behalf. In its answer defendant
denied ownership of the train, denied negligence and pled, among
other things, contributory negligence.
Defendant filed the
sworn affidavits of John Morrison Poole, the engineer, JoAnn R.
Tolson, a claims representative of CSX Transportation, Inc., and, H.
Dean Thomerson, Jr., Claims Manager for CSX Transportation, Inc., in
support of its motion. Plaintiffs filed their individual sworn
affidavit in opposition.
III
[HN1] A motion for
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Defendant asserts three
grounds in support of its motion: (1) That it was not the owner of
the train; (2) That there is a lack of evidence of any negligence in
the operation of the train; and, (3) [*3] Contributory negligence,
as a matter of law, on the part of plaintiffs' intestate. The
contentions will be addressed in the order presented.
(1) Ownership of the
train. Defendant not only denied ownership of the train in its
Answer, as noted, but also, in its Initial Disclosures to Plaintiff
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, stated "there are numerous
documents in defendant's possession which generally describe the
nature of defendant's business and which reflect the fact that
defendant did not own or operate the Train in question." The
Tolson affidavit discloses that the train was owned and operated by,
and the engineer employed by, CSX Transportation, Inc., not CSX
Corporation the named defendant. CSX Transportation, Inc. also owned
the track on which the train was operating. CSX Corporation is a
stock holding company, a separate and distinct corporation from CSX
Transportation, Inc. In spite of being warned of having sued the
wrong defendant, plaintiffs did nothing during discovery to
determine the true owner of the train and move to amend their
complaint to name the proper party. Rather, in their Response to the
Motion for Summary Judgment, they contend that CSX corporation [*4]
owns the stock of CSX Transportation, Inc. n1 and, as such, is
liable for the torts of its agents; that is, that the negligence of
CSX Transportation, Inc. is imputed to CSX Corporation. Absolutely
no authority is cited in support of this contention.
n1 A fact that is not
confirmed in the Tolson affidavit, nor the pleadings or briefs of
defendants.
Recovery in a civil
action must be against the responsible party. Plaintiffs allege that
the accident was caused by the negligence of the engineer. The
engineer is an employee of CSX Transportation, Inc. which is not a
party to this action. Even assuming, which the court is not
persuaded or permitted to do, that defendant is the sole stockholder
of CSX Transportation, Inc., the burden is on plaintiff to show some
reason why it should be responsible for the actions of a separate,
though totally owned, corporation. [HN2] Mere ownership of all of a
subsidiary's stock is not sufficient to disregard the separate
corporate identities. B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 [*5] N.C.
1, 8-9, 149 S.E.2d 570, 575-76 (1966). In order to recover against
the parent plaintiff is required to show fraud or that the
subsidiary is a mere instrumentality or tool of the parent. Id.;
Copley Triangle Assocs. v. Apparel Am., Inc. 96 N.C. App. 263, 265,
385 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1989). Plaintiff has offered no evidence of
either. On this ground alone defendant's motion is well taken.
(2) Lack of negligence
in the operation of the train. The affidavit of the engineer
discloses that he was operating the train within the speed limit;
that he sounded his whistle as required; that he saw the car
approaching the crossing and assumed that it would yield as required
by law; that he sounded his emergency whistle when it was apparent
that the car wasn't slowing down; and, that he was too close to the
crossing to attempt to stop. The affidavit of Wanda Exum Moore
states that the highway patrolman who investigated the accident told
her that the train was traveling about 89 miles per hour when the
accident occurred. The affidavits of both plaintiffs state that they
visited the scene three or four days after the accident and that
visibility at the crossing was obscured by vegetation [*6] growing
near the railroad tracks. Thus, plaintiffs have offered absolutely
no evidence in support of the allegations of negligence contained in
their complaint. The alleged statement by the investigating officer
is clearly hearsay and may not be considered on a motion for summary
judgment even if it were otherwise admissible. The proposed evidence
about vegetation would not be admissible at trial because it was not
alleged in the complaint. In addition, "permitting such
obstacles on the right of way and near the crossing would not in
itself constitute actionable negligence, and independently would not
give rise to a cause of action." May v. Southern Ry., 259 N.C.
43, 49, 129 S.E.2d 624, 628 (1963); see also Moss v. Southern Ry., 2
N.C. App. 50, 56, 162 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1968) (remand for a new trial
because "the jury was permitted to find the defendant negligent
upon the sole basis of a finding that the defendant allowed the view
at the crossing to be obstructed"). On this ground, also, the
motion is well taken.
(3) Contributory
Negligence. The decedent was very familiar with the crossing. A
"crossbuck" warning sign was located approximately 60 feet
from the tracks in the [*7] direction in which the decedent was
travelling. It was night and the headlights of the train were on
their brightest setting, its whistle blowing and bell ringing. There
was nothing to keep the decedent from seeing the train and yielding
the right of way. In not doing so, he was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. See, e.g., Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
276 N.C. 398, 400, 172 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1970); Dowdy v. Southern Ry.,
237 N.C. 519, 524, 75 S.E.2d 639, 642-43 (1953). On this ground,
also, the motion is well taken.
IV
For the reasons set
forth above, the Motion by defendant for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED
and this action is DISMISSED.
This May 3, 1995.
W. EARL BRITT
United States District
Judge
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This
action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have
been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and
this action is DISMISSED. (BRITT, J)
THIS JUDGMENT FILED AND
ENTERED ON MAY 3, 1995, AND COPIES TO:
Robert V. Lucas, Esq.
P. O. Box 309
Selma, NC 27576
John R. Jolly, [*8] Jr.,
Esq.
Randall Adams, Esq.
P. O. Drawer 353
Rocky Mount, NC
27802-0353
May 3, 1995