RAYNOR STEEL ERECTION, a
partnership, and GERALD NELSON RAYNOR and EVA RAYNOR, Partners d/b/a
RAYNOR STEEL ERECTION v. YORK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and THE ATLANTIC STATES
BANKCARD PROPERTIES CORPORATION
No. 8610SC329
COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH
CAROLINA
83 N.C. App. 654; 351
S.E.2d 136; 1986 N.C. App. LEXIS 2743
September 23, 1986, Heard
in the Court of Appeals
December 30, 1986, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]
Appeal by plaintiffs from
Bailey, Judge. Order entered 3 January 1986 in Superior Court, Wake
County.
DISPOSITION:
Vacated.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiffs, partners and their partnership operating as a subcontractor,
sought review of a decision of the Wake County Superior Court (North
Carolina), which entered summary judgment in favor of defendant contractor
in the subcontractor's action concerning the agreement between the
parties.
OVERVIEW: The subcontractor
filed an action against the contractor after a building that the
contractor was constructing collapsed. The subcontractor alleged it was
due to the inferior workmanship of the contractor in constructing the
steel in the building. The contractor's motions for summary judgment
presented evidence, expert and otherwise, tending to show that the
subcontractor did not properly erect the steel for their building and was
liable to the contractor for the structure's collapse. The trial court
granted summary judgment, and the subcontractor appealed. On appeal, the
main question presented was whether the subcontractor's evidence
materially contradicted the contractor's evidence so as to raise a
question of material fact for the jury. The court vacated. The court noted
that the subcontractor's evidence tended to show that they substantially
performed their agreement and duties, and that they properly tightened and
braced the frame, that defective materials furnished by the contractor
were used upon their instructions, and that the structure fell because the
contractor's footings, fabricated steel, and design were defective.
OUTCOME: The court vacated.
SYLLABUS:
Defendant York Construction
Company, the general contractor, architect and engineer for a four-story
steel supported building that was being constructed for the other
defendant, contracted to pay plaintiffs $ 27,999 to erect the steel for
the structure. After plaintiff had erected the steel framing up to the
fourth floor the structure collapsed in a high wind and defendant York
Construction, contending that the collapse was plaintiffs' fault, refused
to pay for the work that had already been done. Plaintiffs sued under
their subcontract to recover $ 22,999 of the defendant general contractor
and to enforce a lien in that amount against the defendant property owner.
York denied liability and counterclaimed for damages in the amount of $
261,580, alleging that in erecting the steel plaintiffs failed to follow
both the contract terms and approved steel construction practices.
Following discovery and a hearing on motions made by the defendants the
court entered an order of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint [***3] and allowing defendant York to recover $ 261,580 of
plaintiffs on its counterclaim.
COUNSEL:
E. Gregory Stott and Poyner
& Spruill, by John L. Shaw and David M. Barnes, for plaintiff
appellants.
Sanford, Adams, McCullough
& Beard, by J. Allen Adams and John J. Butler, for defendant appellee
York Construction Company.
R. Frank Gray for defendant
appellee The Atlantic States Bankcard Properties Corporation.
JUDGES:
Phillips, Judge. Judges Parker
and Cozort concur.
OPINIONBY:
PHILLIPS
OPINION:
[*655] [**137] At the hearing
on defendants' motions for summary judgment they presented much evidence,
expert and otherwise, tending to show that plaintiffs did not properly
erect the steel for their building and are liable to them for the
structure's collapse. In gist, their evidence tends to show that the
framing collapsed in wind of only 27 miles an hour due to two failures on
plaintiffs part -- the failure to adequately brace the steel framing, as
the North Carolina State Building Code requires, and the failure to
tighten various bolts that held the different parts of the framing
together. The main question presented by plaintiffs' appeal is whether
their forecast of evidence [***4] materially contradicts defendants'
evidence as to the particulars stated, and thus raises a question of
material fact for the jury. We believe that it does and vacate the order
of summary judgment.
In pertinent part the
affidavit of the plaintiff Gerald Raynor is to the following effect: He
has twenty-two years experience in steel construction and is familiar with
the generally accepted steel erection practices and procedures in this
state. The drawings for many pieces of structural steel used in the
building did not show bolt connections and required welding to hold them
in place but before the steel could be welded it had to be erected and
plumbed. York provided only two anchor bolts for each steel column,
installed the bolts in concrete blocks not strong enough for the purpose,
and one of the columns could not be firmly attached to an anchor bolt
because the bolt was loose inside the block that it was embedded in. He
told York Construction's site [*656] superintendent, Mr. Little, that he
was concerned that the structural steel had not been designed strong
enough, it didn't have sufficient bracing, and the foundation was not
strong enough to hold up the steel; Little [***5] told him to go ahead
with his work and that York wanted the steel erected as soon as possible.
During construction he discovered that many pieces of the structural steel
were too long or too short and the holes for some connections were too big
or misaligned; because of the defects he could not make the steel pieces
fit snugly against each other, and the connecting bolts did not fit some
of the holes. These fabrication errors were also called to York's
attention and he was again told that they were in a hurry to complete the
building and he should complete his work without further delays. On 27
July 1984 he had erected basically all of the structural steel and had
properly tightened, bolted and braced the structure. He saw the collapsed
steel and in many places the two anchor bolts had pulled out of the
concrete block causing the columns to fall. In his opinion the structure
collapsed because it was not designed properly and because of the
fabrication errors and insufficient footings described.
This forecast of plaintiffs'
proof at trial clearly raises issues of material fact for a jury and the
court's ruling to the contrary is error. It tends to show, inter alia,
that [***6] plaintiffs substantially performed their agreement and duties,
and that they properly tightened and braced the frame; that defective
materials furnished by defendants were used upon their instructions; and
that the structure fell because defendants' footings, fabricated steel and
design were defective. Nor is the judgment necessarily correct, as
defendants argue, because defendants' proof indicates that the State
Building Code was not complied with and there is authority for the
proposition that the Code holds the erector strictly liable for properly
bracing and tightening a steel frame under construction. Lindstrom v.
Chesnutt, 15 N.C. App. 15, 189 S.E. 2d 749, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 757,
191 S.E. 2d 361 (1972). For plaintiffs' forecast of evidence gives rise to
the legal principle that [HN1] a subcontractor is not liable [**138] to
his contractor for using the contractor's materials and following the
contractor's instructions. Burke County Public Schools Board of Education
v. Juno Construction Corp., 50 N.C. App. 238, 273 S.E. 2d 504, aff'd, 304
N.C. 187, 282 S.E. 2d 778 (1981); 17A C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 515 (1963).
But, of course, which of the many legal rules [***7] that could apply to
the case actually [*657] do so will depend upon the view that the jury
takes of the evidence when it is presented to them. Which is why issues
involving negligence, proximate cause, reasonableness and the like can
seldom be correctly determined by summary judgment. Lamb v. Wedgewood
South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E. 2d 868 (1983). Thus, the judgment
entered is vacated in all respects.
Vacated.