|
According to Fourth
Circuit precedent, to survive a motion for summary judgment in a Title
VII employment discrimination case, the plaintiff must show that (1) she
is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; (3) she was performing her job at a level that met her
employer’s legitimate job expectations at the time of the adverse
employment action; and (4) that the position remained open or was filled
by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.
In Miles v. Dell,
Inc., plaintiff Kimberly Miles, a former account manager at Dell,
Inc., sued the company under Title VII alleging that she was discharged
because of her sex and pregnancy. Prior to her discharge, Miles’
supervisor was James Glaze. Shortly after Miles informed Glaze that she
was pregnant, Glaze reduced Miles’ sales territory and reassigned her
key accounts to another employee who had no prior sales experience. In
May 2001, Glaze increased Miles’ individual sales quotas and told her
that she would remain responsible for realizing those quotas during her
maternity leave. After reporting (falsely, according to Miles) to
Dell’s human resource officer that Miles had lied to him about the
status of a customer contract, Glaze requested permission to fire Miles,
but the request was refused.
On June 30, 2001,
Miles gave birth to her daughter. She then returned to work after two
weeks of maternity leave. Nine months later, Glaze gave Miles an
unsatisfactory performance rating and placed her on a performance
improvement plan. After forwarding an email from one of Miles’
disgruntled customers to human resources, Glaze finally obtained consent
to terminate Miles’ employment. Although Glaze wanted to hire a man to
replace Miles, that effort was vetoed by his superiors, who ultimately
decided to offer Miles’ position to another woman.
The district court
granted Dell's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, under
Fourth Circuit precedent, Miles failed to make out a prima facie case of
sex or pregnancy discrimination because she was replaced by another
woman. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling as to
Plaintiff’s sex and pregnancy discrimination claims. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that while ordinarily a Title VII plaintiff must show that
either the position remained open or that it was filled by someone
outside the protected class, an exception exists where the discharge and
replacement hiring decisions were made by different decision makers.
That is, when the plaintiff can show that the firing and hiring
decisions were made by different decision makers, she need not show as
part of her prima facie case that she was replaced by someone outside
her protected class.
The Fourth Circuit
also reversed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the employer on the
Plaintiff’s clam for pregnancy discrimination. The Court noted that for
the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination, the protected class is pregnant women, not all women.
Because the woman hired to replace Miles was not pregnant, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that she was replaced by someone outside her protected
class.
This
opinion is significant in that it demonstrates that employers are not
necessarily insulated from discrimination claims simply because the
replacement is member of the same protected class as the plaintiff.
If you have
any questions regarding this alert or other Employment Law related
questions, please contact
Anuja Purohit at 919.783.2823 or
apurohit@poyners.com
or Susie
Gibbons at 919.783.2813 or sgibbons@poynerspruill.com.
|
