Supreme Court Holds that Rental of Spaces for Placement of Mobile Homes Constituted a "Subdivision" as was Defined in the Local Ordinance (March 31, 2005)

The North Carolina Supreme Court considered the case of Jones v. Davis this month. The defendants in the case own roughly forty-one acres of land in Surry County. The plaintiffs are neighboring property owners. The defendants submitted an application for a manufactured home park as required by the County’s Manufactured Home Park Ordinance but then took no further steps to proceed with that application. Shortly thereafter, they submitted a preliminary subdivision plat for twenty acres and then a second plat for the remaining acres. Both plats were eventually approved and the defendants began leasing the individual lots to third parties who brought in mobile homes.

At the time, Surry County had a Manufactured Home and Manufactured Home Park Ordinance in effect. However, those ordinances expressly applied only to unsubdivided parcels. There was no zoning ordinance in place at the time. The plaintiffs assert that the definition of "subdivision" does not include the rental of spaces to third parties for placements of mobile homes and that, because the property was not subdivided, the Manufactured Home Park Ordinance should apply.

On appeal at the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ arguments. The majority explained that the subdivision ordinance defines subdivision as "all divisions of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, building sites, or other divisions for the purpose of sale or building development (whether immediate or future)." It also flatly rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the subdivision ordinance regulates use.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wynn held that rental of lots for mobile homes does not fit within the definition of subdivision and thus, the Manufactured Home Park Ordinance should apply. He noted that the terms "sale" and "building development," which are used in the definition of subdivision, are not defined in the ordinance. However, the defendants mere renting of lots without any involvement with the placement of the mobile homes onto the lots and where the lessees had no contract to purchase the lots, did not qualify within the ordinary meanings of either "sale" or "building development."

The Supreme Court rejected Judge Wynn’s dissent and affirmed the majority’s decision holding that the partition of the lots for rental did meet the Subdivision Ordinance’s definition of "subdivision" and that the Subdivision Ordinance, in no way, regulated use.

If you have any questions regarding this alert, please contact Kacey Ragsdale at 919.783.2957 or kragsdale@poynerspruill.com or Robin Tatum at 919.783.2931 or rtatum@poynerspruill.com.